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Abstrak 
The old wells oil management is petroleum management which accentuates the empowerment 
of local communities in the producing region. The goal of this oil management is to provide 
maximum prosperity for the people as mandated by Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution. This 
paper aims to formulate the model of old wells oil management based on the social justice 
principle. This paper has a normative legal study method that uses a term of old wells 
management in Wonocolo oil fields, Bojonegoro regency. The result is because old wells oil 
management in Wonocolo oil field does not fully reflect the social justice principle, then it 
causes illegal mining activities. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a model of old wells 
management based on the principle of social justice with two indicators i.e. 1) The equal 
distribution of benefits and 2) Participation. 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
The management of petroleum 
natural resources in Indonesia is based on 
Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution of the 
Republic of Indonesia 
(hereinafter abbreviated as the Constitution 
of Indonesia), which is an economic 
ideology based on economic democracy. 
More precisely, Article 33 section (3) of the 
Constitution of Indonesia establishes 
guidelines for natural resource management 
to achieve social justice, where state-
controlled natural resources are to be 
handled for the maximum benefit of the 
people. 
Petroleum became a strategic 
commodity for Indonesia because in the 
1970s Indonesia was one of the developing 
countries. Indonesia was contributed 95% 
of all world oil production. However, the 
upstream sector continues to run into 
decreased production due to natural decline 
and low investment in oil exploration and 
its success. Questioning as the upstream 
industry's lifeblood plays a vital role in 
finding new oil reserves, but it doesn't 
always go well. Meanwhile, without the 
discovery of further resources, Indonesia's 
proven oil reserves will only last 12 years 
(Syeirazi, 2017, p. 88). 
One of the steps that can be taken to 
full fill the national oil demand is to 
optimize old well’s productivity. On the 
large industrial scale, this is done with the 
Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) tertiary 
lifting technique, namely by injecting the 
well with a liquid consisting of gases such 
as carbon dioxide or nitrogen, steam, 
polymer, gel, etc. (Goodwin et al., 2013, 
p.36). EOR can increase output yield up to 
73% depending on the material injected and 
the conditions in the field (Mischenko, 
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2001, p. 3) 
In other conditions, the optimization 
of old wells in Indonesia is also carried out 
without being technically intensive, but 
traditionally. The management of old wells 
is regulated in the Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources Regulation Number 01 
of 2008 on Guidelines of Mining 
Exploitation at Old Wells 
(hereinafter abbreviated as the Permen 
ESDM No. 01/2008). Based on Article 1 
point 2 of the Regulation, old wells that can 
be managed by mining communities 
through a cooperation agreement between 
the Contractor and Village Unit 
Cooperative (known as KUD)/ Regional 
Owned Enterprises (known as BUMD), are 
wells drilled before 1970; ever produced, 
and is located in the Contractor's working 
area but is no longer cultivated (Kuncoro et 
al., 2019). 
The management of old wells in 
Wonocolo Village, Bojonegoro Regency, 
East Java Province is one of several existing 
old wells. Its government is regulated more 
specifically in Bojonegoro Regent 
Regulation Number 30 of 2017 on 
Guidelines for the Guidance of Mining and 
Mining Groups at Old Oil Well in 
Bojonegoro Regency 
(hereinafter abbreviated as the Perbup 
Bojonegoro No. 30/2017). The old well 
management model in Wonocolo has 
undergone several changes in governance. 
In 1960 the old well management regime 
was initially under the authority of the 
Chief of Village (Naumi & Trilaksana, 
2015, pp. 138-139). The old well in 
Wonocolo had been included in the 
Pertamina work area until 1988. It is now 
included in the work area of Pertamina EP, 
Peseroan Terbatas (PT or known as Limited 
Company), Asset IV 
(hereinafter abbreviated as Pertamina EP, 
PT), and it’s handled by Bojonegoro 
Bangun Sarana, PT 
(hereinafter abbreviated as the BBS, PT), 
which is a Bojonegoro’s BUMD. 
Based on the findings of the author's 
review of non-legal materials, illicit mining 
activities are known to occur in the 
excavation of old wells in Wonocolo and 
impact environmental harm. Illegal mining 
takes place at stage 1) operations in the 
form of drilling new wells and 2) 
production of petroleum refining activities 
before the sale of its distillates to other than 
contractors. That is done by miners who 
feel disadvantaged in old wells mining 
(Hartati & Marita, 2017, p. 763). 
Meanwhile, based on Total Petroleum 
Hydrocarbon (TPH), soil and surface water 
pollution at the mining site in Wonocolo is 
included in the highest hazard level 
(category A) (Sari & Trihadiningrum, 2018, 
p. 191). 
This is because of the many social, 
economic, and legal issues that have arisen 
since 70 years ago. William Ophuls (2011) 
menyatakan pemanfaatan dan eksploitasi 
lingkungan sumber daya alam pada 
akhirnya dapat menghasilkan bentuk baru 
dari keadaan lingkungan (Whitehead, 2017. 
p. 9).  Based on the findings of interviews 
with miners, BUMD 's Legal Manager 
Bojonegoro, Supervisor of the Pertamina 
EP, PTProduction Unit, the researchers 
concluded that three factors triggered the 
rampant illegal mining activities, namely: 
1. Waiver and unclear position of 
miners; 
2. Unfair distribution of fees; and 
3. The absence of supervision over 
the management of petroleum in 
old wells. 
As a result of illegal mining that 
JUSTITIA JURNAL HUKUM 
FAKULTAS HUKUM UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH SURABAYA 
192 
Volume 6 No 2 Bulan Oktober Tahun 2021 
ISSN Cetak: 2579-9983, E-ISSN: 2579 6380 
Halaman. 190-202 
occurs, of course, reduces the welfare of 
many parties for the sake of only a few 
groups of people so that the greatest 
prosperity of the people is impossible to 
materialize. This certainly injures the 
concept of the principle of social justice, 
which has been institutionalized in Article 
33 of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic 
of Indonesia. Illegal mining and 
environmental pollution problems do not 
only occur in the management of old wells 
in Wonocolo. Where this shows the issue of 
illegal mining is not casuistic, but problems 
arise from the time it is regulated, whereas 
Indonesia is a state of law (rechtsstaat) 
(Baranyanan et al., 2019, 494). It cannot be 
denied that the mining industry is a source 
of employment and income. However, its 
presence does not see the problems and 
challenges itself, instead, it has an impact 
on society and the environment (Kolala & 
Bwalya Umar, 2019, pp. 1-2).  
Therefore, an old well-managed model 
focused on social justice must be 
conceived. The Constitutional Court's 
decision offers four benchmarks to assess 
that a law is intended to provide the people 
with the greatest opportunity possible as a 
means of economic justice that will 
eventually bring about social justice. The 
following are the criteria as the purpose of 
the monitoring according to the 
Constitutional Court (Arizona, 2011, p. 
299), two of them are the level of 
distribution of natural resources' benefits 
and the level of people's participation in 
determining the benefits of natural 
resources. At the same time, the benefits of 
petroleum and the recognition of customary 
rights are deemed fulfilled by the author. 
The definition of economic justice 
belonging to Louis Kelso and Mortimer 
Adler both promotes the use of those 
metrics. Three basic values are 
interdependent in economic justice, 
namely: 1) participation; 2) distribution; 
and 3) harmony. The three of them are 
related to each other to sustain a build of 
economic justice. 
 
B. FIELD FINDING 
Petroleum Natural Resources Mastery at 
Old Well 
Indonesia, through the constitution, 
states that it is a state based on law. 
Therefore, it has the aim of avoiding 
disturbances, maintaining order, security, 
and peace, and maintaining needs and 
interests to achieve justice. Where everyone 
gets what they have right to achieve mutual 
prosperity and happiness, that is, the 
fulfillment of their needs and interests 
(Notonagoro, 1994, p. 16). In Indonesia, 
justice is articulated in the fifth principle of 
Pancasila, which reads "Social Justice for 
All Indonesians." According to Kaelan, the 
fifth precept has a doctrinal meaning and 
animates it, since it is an aspect of Pancasila 
(Kaelan, 1996, p. 152). 
The State's aim of pursuing equity in 
the area of natural petroleum resources also 
applies to Pancasila's fifth concept. No 
provision for the historically performed 
extraction of petroleum in old wells. In 
general, justice is related to economic 
justice in the field of natural resources. 
Justice, however, has many aspects and 
dimensions, including legal justice, 
economic justice, political justice, and 
social justice. Social justice is not a 
synonym for economic or legal justice. But 
the ultimate objective of thoughts and 
dreams of justice is social justice in real life, 
embodied in the collective experience 
system of society. This means that social 
justice is an aim that the state needs to 
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accomplish, in order to bring prosperity to 
all its citizens (Jaelani et al., 2019). 
The concept of justice adopted by a 
country has a strong influence on the state's 
way of realizing welfare for its people. In 
managing natural resources in Indonesia, 
the embodiment of the principle of social 
justice is institutionalized in Article 33 of 
the Constitution of Indonesia. Article 33 of 
the Constitution of Indonesia is an 
economic constitution that explains that 
control of natural resources is in the hands 
of the state. In other words, Indonesia 
adheres to state regimes. This 
understanding provides a shield so that a 
few influential people or groups do not 
control natural resources. Because the 
principle of people's economy brought 
about in Article 33 of the Constitution of 
Indonesia explains that the authority of 
natural resources is to prioritize the 
community (togetherness or mutualism), 
not on individual prosperity 
(individualism). 
This is very different from the 
concept of private regimes, where 
individuals are the owners of rights in 
exploiting natural oil resources, which are 
common property. Garret Hardin in "The 
Tragedy of the Commons" agrees that the 
unhappiness caused by the exploitation of 
shared resources will continue to occur if 
there are no limits to recognizing needs. 
This is closely related to the inability of the 
human population to continue to exploit 
natural resources excessively (Hardin, 
2017, p. 1248).  State control is exercised in 
the management of old wells in Wonocolo 
through cooperation between state-owned 
enterprises (hereinafter referred to as 
BUMN), namely Pertamina EP, PT 
(Contractors) and, BUMD Bojonegoro, 
namely BBS, PT (Subcontractors). BUMN 
's existence is one of the minimal types 
directly present by the state for controlling 
its natural resources. Where this can impact 
management performance, which has 
consequences for the degree of distribution 
of profits from natural resources 
themselves, the calculation of how much 
wealth people get from the outcomes of 
managing petroleum in old wells can also 
be seen from the level of state control over 
natural resources. Ideally, the state is the 
one that includes natural resources entirely.  
The management of petroleum was 
decided between Pertamina EP, PT and 
BBS, PT (BUMD Bojonegoro) in the old 
Minya Field well, Wonocolo. The Mining 
Group mines it, which still leaves 
unresolved legal, social, and economic 
issues. George Soros in Macartan 
Humphreys (2007) notes that the presence 
of natural resources in a country is like a 
double-edged knife, or is called a resource 
curse, since natural resources will help 
people if properly managed, but will cause 
many problems such as loss and harm if not 
properly managed (Handayani, 2014, p. 
51). Naturally, the existence of a mine 
resource deposit always interacts and is 
related to the surrounding environment 
(Zulkifli, 2014, p. 7), both in interactions 
that have a positive impact and businesses 
that have a negative effect. Likewise, the 
issue of illegal mining is still serious, and it 
seems complicated to stop in the mining 
process in Wonocolo. 
The issues that emerged in the 
Wonocolo case study were not caused 
exclusively by casuistic factors (only 
happened in Wonocolo). However, cases of 
illegal mining and environmental damage 
may also occur in the management of old 
wells in other regions, for example in 
Samarinda (Desmawangga, n.d.) and the 
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Musi Banyuasin area (Yuswalina; Candra, 
2017, Jurnal Muamalah, p. 62). Because 
basically, the problem of illegal mining 
arises from the level of content of the 
regulatory material governing how the 
exploitation of old wells is carried out. 
Establishing a strong legal foundation 
is the starting point for protecting and 
recognizing strategies for promoting 
ecological democracy rights. In the concept 
of environmental democracy, public 
participation in forming standard policies 
has an important role (Pratisti & Wibawa, 
2017, p. 151). Ecological democracy 
cannot be distinguished from current, 
closely connected concepts of 
environmental justice and sustainable 
justice. Law and Gleeson (1998) discuss 
two aspects: fairness in generation-to-
generation environmental distribution, and 
justice in human relationships and others in 
nature (Baxter, 2005, p. 7). This concept is 
the basis for maintaining ecological 
sustainability and balance. 
Djatmiati (2007) notes that to prevent 
conflicts of norms, it is more necessary to 
draft correct legislation before addressing 
legal problems that arise in the field due to 
permits that have been issued (Djatmiati, 
2007, p. 5). Essential components which 
must be the basis for the establishment of a 
legal and political framework for the 
management of natural oil resources 
relating to state control which reflects 
national sovereignty are a) ownership of 
natural resources; b) state control; c) 
authority of State-owned enterprises in the 
oil mining sector to cooperate with third 
parties (especially with third parties) 
(Ulfatun Najicha et al., 2020, p. 1204). 
Recognition of the Participation of the 
Mining Community 
The miners who are members of the 
Mining Community are the parties who 
carry out petroleum extraction in old wells. 
However, there is inadequate control of the 
miners who are the most important 
participants in this management. Article 2 
section (3) Permen ESDM No. 01/2008 
carries only KUD or BUMD, and 
Contractors only. Old wells governance is 
aimed at developing the local economy 
through community engagement. Likewise, 
the uncertain relationship between the 
Mining Community and the BUMD 
Bojonegoro has disrupted the sense of 
responsibility for the social and 
environmental effects of maintaining old 
wells, and the recognition of Community 
participation in mining (Sukmoro et al., 
2019). 
Haedjasoemantri (1990) needs more 
specific community engagement to be 
successful, namely the process through 
which the rights of the community in 
environmental management are recognized. 
Arnstein (1969) stated that the sense of 
attendance can fall into a void ritual 
(pseudo-ceremony), which is only 
symptomatic of regulations. Followed by a 
culture of silence for different reasons, it 
may cause the loss of a sincere sense of duty 
to engage in saving nature to fall to a 
rhetorical level alone by the next century 
(Wijaksono, 2013, p. 29). Therefore, the 
Mining Group's recognition as an 
independent entity from the elements of the 
community needs to be regulated even at 
the level of the Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources Regulation, which 
controls the mining of petroleum in old 
wells. This means that it is not only 
regulated in Regional Regulations because 
not all of the Regional Regulations regulate 
the existence of miners in the exploitation 
JUSTITIA JURNAL HUKUM 
FAKULTAS HUKUM UNIVERSITAS MUHAMMADIYAH SURABAYA 
195 
Volume 6 No 2 Bulan Oktober Tahun 2021 
ISSN Cetak: 2579-9983, E-ISSN: 2579 6380 
Halaman. 190-202 
of old wells. The inclusion of the Mining 
Group in the regulation will strengthen the 
spirit of community participation in the 
legal, social, and economic sectors 
(Karjoko et al., 2020). 
The Mining Industry is a company 
that has been around for decades. Through 
prioritizing shared principles, they 
implement conventional management. 
Hartig and the Rules (1993) in (Mitchell et 
al., 2016, p. 257 & 259) stated that effective 
participation is not only assessed by the 
number of people participating, but one of 
which is also influenced by trust, 
communication, opportunity, and 
flexibility. In this case, Mitchell also 
conveyed one of the critical elements of 
successful participation and partnership, 
which lies in the balance of trust and power. 
The balance of guardianship and 
power is an aspect which recognizes the 
involvement of the parties involved. Many 
who may have less resources or capabilities 
than others need to be formed in order to 
remain active. Without question, the 
thoroughly acknowledged engagement 
would give birth to people who are not 
apathetic to the survival of good old 
management. Arnstein (1969) suggests that 
engagement reflects the transfer of power 
between managers and society. At the level 
of citizen control, the highest level of 
participation is where society can also 
influence policies (Arnstein, 1969 p. 217)). 
Therefore, in recognition of community 
involvement as an independent entity, it 
should be regulated in a Regulation of the 
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources.  
At this level, the community has the 
power to regulate programs or institutions 
related to their interests. The organization 
has the authority and can negotiate with 
outside parties who wish to make changes. 
This is because the Indonesian economy 
concept is based on economic democracy 
so that the State must control the essential 
production branches. Suppose the 
Indonesian State cannot do all this. In that 
case, the authorities will handle the 
production leadership, and the people will 
only be spectators and be affected by the 
destruction of natural resources and the 
environment (Ulfatun Najicha et al., 2020, 
p. 1202). 
There are law firms in Ukraine, for 
example, that include members of the 
public who wish to be active in deciding 
important government policies. Where 
Ukraine strategically positions civic 
evaluation and group engagement 
(Kravchenko, 2002, pp. 204, 208). Besides, 
the recognition that miners deserve also 
emphasizes the local wisdom of the local 
community. It is undeniable that in the life 
order, traditional communities uphold 
values that are near related to customary 
law which originate from within their 
communities (Hanifah et al., 2018, p. 412). 
Furthermore, Wildavsky (1987) stated that 
culture influences the formation of 
viewpoints or preferences by embed 
cultural norms and values (Ramsay, 1996, 
p. 99). 
In addition, the researcher instructed 
the Mining Group not only to conduct 
administrative ties with BUMD by 
registering the Mining Group with BUMD, 
in order to increase public awareness of 
their involvement. However, a good civil 
partnership is bound to a formal agreement 
between the Mining Community and the 
BUMD. The Mining Company must first be 
legalized as a company to be able to do so. 
The Regional Government and the Village 
Government should question credibility in 
such a way that the Mining Company entity 
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as the manager of old wells is factually 
more legitimate. Of course, by paying 
attention to the requirements of whether or 
not anyone who is part of the Mining 
Community will become a miner.  
Closing the Profits Sharing Model 70% 
of Investors and 30% of Miners 
The results of petroleum production from 
old wells, which all have to be deposited 
with the Contractor through KUD or 
BUMD, are alleged to be the most potent 
trigger for illegal mining practices. Drilling 
of new wells, refining crude oil, 
transporting it until it is sold to Collectors 
or ‘Parengkek’/Retailers are activities that 
violate the law because they are not by 
those stipulated in Article 9 and Article 10 
paragraph (1) Permen ESDM No. 01/2018. 
This practice persists since the payments 
paid are insufficient to meet the mining 
community's welfare. However, at the end 
of the day researchers would agree with the 
idea of turning over all the oil production 
from the mining of old fields. This is 
because the effects of output from the old 
wells were originally planned to increase 
the supply of national oil. This means that 
the production of old wells is used to meet 
the national fuel oil requirements. 
Depositing all the crude oil will also reduce 
unfair rivalry between refining miners. 
Pertamina EP, PT also purchases oil for 
January 2020 according to Indonesian 
crude oil price, which amounts to IDR 
3645.64/litter. The amount of the price of 
crude oil is then used for subsequent 
calculation of the value of the invoice.  
Most often arises in cases of illegal 
mining because miners are not profitable if 
they service wells for which the Group of 
Miners bears the costs. In contrast, wells 
that have been serviced may not necessarily 
produce significant oil. Second, the unfair 
distribution of fees as a form of profit 
between Pertamina EP, PT and BUMD 
Bojonegoro for the miners. The miner feels 
that the proceeds from depositing oil are not 
even sufficient for the production costs. 
Pertamina EP, PT and BUMD Bojonegoro 
have arranged the percentage sharing of 
fees. The purchase price of oil is also 
determined dynamically following the 
market price of crude oil. The amount of the 
purchase price is notified by Pertamina EP, 
PT to BUMD Bojonegoro through an 
official letter every month. Therefore, 
according to the second author, it is no 
longer relevant in current management. 
Moreover, the Mining Group has received 
direct payments from the Trader Group, 
which complicates sharing the 90% service 
fee, which should be invoiced directly by 
the Mining Group to BUMD Bojonegoro. 
(Sukmoro et al., 2019) 
Researchers evaluate the deprivation 
of the miners as a result of the limited 
income they earn due to investors' entry into 
the management of old wells. Investors get 
70% of the profits from petroleum reserves, 
while the Mining Party gets just 30%, so it 
has to be split between representatives of 
15-50 individuals. This, of course, greatly 
lowers the yields miners are receiving. This 
image is similar to the argument by Paul 
Wolfowitz, since more than 50% of the 
output is given to other parties. Many poor 
people in the world live in countries that are 
rich in natural petroleum resources 
(Setyadi, 2017, p. 9). For this reason, the 
authors are introducing a new model of 
management to close the door to 
investments detrimental to the Mining 
industry. It is governed, based on Article 8 
of the Perbup Bojonegoro No. 30/2017, that 
the financing of good old management is 
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carried out by the owners of the WK 
(Contractor), BUMD, and the banking 
sector, and miners. Sadly, this system is not 
being fully enforced. The proof is that there 
are so many Mining Groups that rely on 
investments from other parties, even from 
outside the country, for their management. 
Through this paper, a model for 
capital assistance can be formulated for 
miners by Pertamina EP, PT, BUMD 
Bojonegoro and the miners together. 
Capital assistance is carried out by adopting 
the 10% Participating Interest (PI 10%) 
system implemented in the oil industry 
nationally (Kemenko Bidang 
Perekonomian, 2019, p. 3). The regulation 
can be included in the Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources at the same time so 
that it has more substantial legal 
consequences. However, still pay attention 
to the laws and regulations that preceded it, 
such as Law Number 22 of 2001, The 
Government Regulation Number 35 of 
2004, Permen ESDM Number 37 of 2016, 
as well as other laws and regulations that 
could be related to the adoption of this PI 
10% scheme. When talking about PI 10% 
in the actual context, the Contractor is 
obliged to offer PI 10% to BUMN in their 
working area, since the first approval of the 
field development plan (Plan of 
Development) by the Minister of Energy 
and Mineral Resources (Kemenko Bidang 
Perekonomian, 2015, p. 28). Then the 
Contractor will provide financing for the PI 
10% rights owned by BUMD. 
Meanwhile, Pertamina EP, PT 
(Contractor) and BUMD Bojonegoro 
(Subcontractor) are jointly introducing a 
hierarchical scheme of work in this model. 
Then provide pre-financing of the amount 
of capital the Mining Group needs for the 
maintenance of old fields. The repayment 
of the financing will be made every 
particular period without interest from the 
output of the Mining Group while also 
maintaining a fair share of the revenue for 
the Mining Group.  
The percentage of well-opening and 
operational capital financing provided by 
the Contractor and BUMD can be 
determined by deliberation. Likewise, the 
return on the funding that must be returned, 
the total production percentage is also 
determined by review. In this case, thinking 
is intended by the author to have an attitude 
of the mutual understanding of the 
management conditions of old wells. This 
is because the amount of petroleum 
reserves in each oil field is different. The 
financing percentage is adjusted to the 
Mining Group's needs and the condition of 
oil production from old wells. Therefore, 
Contractors and BUMD must also be 
concerned with the amount of production of 
old wells and the natural decline rate. If the 
plan is taken, 70% will be allocated to 
return on capital and 30% to operations, 
with a benefit of IDR 3,000,000/week (after 
deducting the Workers' Group's salaries) 
and money to open a well of IDR1-1.3 
billion (assuming no funds from the Mining 
Group) then, within 10-12 years, the 
funding will be completely refundable. For 
this reason, while there is a financing cost 
that the BUMD owes to the Contractor, the 
funding can be paid in full and the miners 
can expect better results in management. 
 
Involvement of all Parties in Old Well 
Mining Supervision 
One of the implications that must be carried 
out is proper monitoring in the maintenance 
of old wells. This is particularly true when 
the Mining Group is introducing a capital 
financing scheme. If illicit mining activities 
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are not regulated and prevented, the 
financing party will suffer detriment. 
Supervision is also needed to prevent 
irregularities from mining old wells that can 
cause environmental damage. BUMD 
Bojonegoro, as the owner of an oil mining 
permit in an old well, is the party most 
responsible for what happens in its mining 
area. Therefore, a license is a preventive 
instrument to prevent behavior that violates 
existing rules or norms (Djatmiati, 2007, p. 
3). 
The license issued is a way for the 
government to regulate and control all 
commercial activities undertaken by the 
state, legal entities (companies), or 
businesses in the case of environmental 
harm resulting from mining activities. 
Currently, though, actions that affect the 
environment due to the issuance of a permit 
are no longer the community's intervention 
where the action is being carried out. As a 
result, this just becomes the Government's 
full authority (Prabowo et al., 2019, pp. 58-
59). The authors propose a new model for 
controlling the maintenance of old wells to 
discourage illicit mining activities in the 
event of more serious harm to the 
environment. In his Course Book, Recent 
Trends in General Administrative Law in 
The Netherlands, J.B.J.M. Ten Berge 
claims that there are 2 (two) compliance 
instruments in administrative law, namely 
controlling and implementing sanctions. 
Leadership is a proactive move to force 
enforcement while implementing sanctions 
is a punitive phase in moving enforcement 
to be completed (Sembiring et al., 2014, 
(Sembiring, Rahman, Napitupulu, Quina, & 
Fajrini, 2014, p. 178). 
Supervision in maintaining old wells 
in Wonocolo Village is now basically 
ineffective. Maintenance would be 
pointless when law enforcement is not in 
operation. Poor law enforcement is 
sometimes viewed as an important issue. 
Administrative law enforcement standards 
have greater competitive advantages in 
activities requiring community 
involvement, such as controlling natural 
resources and the environment, than civil 
and criminal law instruments (Santosa, 
2001: 248): 
1. Enforcement of administrative law 
in the environmental sector can be 
a preventive tool. 
2. Preventive administrative law 
enforcement can be more efficient 
in terms of financing. Funding for 
administrative law enforcement 
includes routine field surveillance 
costs that are cheaper than the 
effort to gather evidence, employ 
expert witnesses to prove aspects 
of causality (cause and effect) in 
criminal and civil cases. 
3. Administrative law enforcement is 
more capable of inviting public 
participation. Public participation 
is carried out starting from the 
licensing process, monitoring 
arrangement/supervision, and 
involvement in filing objections 
and asking administration officials 
to impose administrative 
sanctions. 
In the management of old wells in 
Wonocolo, espite the fact that the 
community has the potential to cause 
environmental damage due to oil spills due 
to mining activities. But legally, it is the 
license holder responsible for the damage 
and not solely the miner's responsibility. 
This is because the miners are not the 
parties granted the concession permit, but 
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the Bojonegoro BUMD. However, BUMD 
Bojonegoro will not be able to do much 
against all types of damage because BUMD 
is not the mining party. The problems 
between the company and the community 
around the mine are closely related to the 
absence of government supervision 
(Wicaksono, Handayani, et al., 2020, p. 
7173). 
The authors therefore propose that 
regulations are in effect for the control of 
the mining activities of old wells. This is to 
discourage illegal mining, and Pertamina 
EP, PT handles environmental degradation 
as the owner, the concession licensing party 
BUMD Bojonegoro, and the Mining 
Company, which actually mines in the 
Wonocolo Oil Field. This is done to 
regulate the parties that have the right to 
supervise mining activities in the Ministry 
of Energy and Mineral Resources, 
particularly in activities carried out at the 
mining sites. The Parties are monitored in 
an interconnected way, not individually. 
How much oil is produced every day can be 
monitored, so that all the oil can be 
deposited to Pertamina EP, PT. 
Assume that the funding made using 
the participating interest model can be 
adequately carried out. In that case, there 
should be mutual oversight by stakeholders 
or groups who play a role in managing old 
wells. This is, of course, to sustain the trust 
given to the Mining Group to fund it. But 
the Mining Company is not entirely 
responsible for the harm to the environment 
and the fear of crude oil refining. Indeed, 
communication and public education are 
important and influential in carrying out 
government policies (Bräutigam, 2000, p. 
259). 
Local governments can also engage 
in real regulation and play a state 
administrative law supervisory role in 
government administration. To avoid 
deviations from the government duties 
outlined and to correct any differences that 
occur. Participation of all parties is 
important, especially on central and 
regional level stakeholders. Includes 
attempts to incorporate ecological 
management policies in the application of 
local autonomy (Akib et al., 2019, p. 84). 
Integrated supervision and in accordance 
with the principle of important supervision 
is carried out before or after mining 
activities (Wicaksono, Rachmi, et al., 2020, 
2984). When talking about Strategic 
Environmental Assessment, from the start, 
stakeholder participation is very important 
to determine the policies taken. The impact 
is on increasing environmental priorities, 
increasing social responsibility, and 
becoming policy learning (Slunge & 
Loayza, 2012, p. 248). It is true that if the 
government's way of thinking in making 
policies is not renewed and developed, 
collaborative stakeholder participation will 
not occur (Ngo et al., 2019, p. 1). 
What is more critical, however, than 
that, is community engagement. In the book 
Citizen Involvement in Planning, Avent 
(1972) notes that the secret to successful 
community engagement is managers' and 
policymakers' ability to engage the 
population. Otherwise, it would just end up 
being a hoax (Fagence, 1977, p. 18). And in 
the end, the management of the old well 
will continue to have legal, social, and 
economic problems without strong 
community involvement. This would 
inevitably lead to deprivation in natural 
resources themselves so that the world will 
be far from a stable and healthy state. For 
this reason, the three above models may be 
implemented in laws and regulations based 
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on the concept of social justice, which is 
calculated using measures of equal income 
distribution and involvement in society. 
Considering, therefore, the harmonization 
of laws and regulations. Without a valid 
legal framework, the government cannot 
guarantee the fulfillment of the rights of 
individuals with policies geared towards the 
maximum welfare of the people. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
Based on an analysis of the laws and 
regulations related to the exploitation of old 
wells and a case study in the Wonocolo 
Village Oil Field, a model for petroleum 
management in old wells based on social 
justice principles can be constructed. This 
model can be adopted to make changes to 
laws and regulations, i.e. giving admission 
to the local community as a party of factual 
mining activities in the ESDM Ministerial 
Regulation, changing the funding system of 
old wells operation using the concept 
adapted from the scheme of 'Participating 
Interest 10% and Stakeholder involvement 
consist of Local Government, Contractor, 
KUD/BUMD, and mining groups in 
integrated supervision of old wells oil 
management. 
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